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The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) allows noncitizens to bring civil actions in US
federal courts for a select class of particularly egregious violations of international
law. Human rights activists have pushed the boundaries of the ATS in recent decades, and the Supreme Court has responded by establishing several limiting rules
for ATS jurisdiction. Most recently, in April 2018, the Supreme Court ruled in
Jesner v Arab Bank that foreign corporations cannot be defendants in ATS suits.
Following Jesner, plaintiffs in ongoing ATS suits have dropped key corporate defendants from their complaints.
This Comment argues that courts and litigants should pause to consider how
“foreign corporation” ought to be defined when applying the Jesner rule to transnational corporations. While a formalistic rule based on place of incorporation or location of headquarters might seem the obvious choice, it is not a necessary one. This
Comment considers possible alternatives and concludes that a functional standard
that determines a corporation’s “foreignness” based on its actual ties to the United
States best serves the purpose of the ATS as defined by Jesner. To that end, this
Comment introduces a standard I call the Functional Foreignness Test, which defines a foreign corporation as a corporation whose ties to the United States are at
least as strong as to any other nation. Such a standard ensures that ATS jurisdiction, which can have substantial implications for both foreign relations and human
rights, does not turn on a formality that may have little relation to a corporation’s
actual ties or activities.
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INTRODUCTION
Over ten years ago, former child slaves initiated a class action
suit against numerous corporate defendants for aiding and abetting the use of child slavery in Ivory Coast in violation of international law norms that prohibit slavery, forced labor, child labor,
torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 1 Defendants included Nestlé SA, the Swiss parent company of various
Nestlé subsidiaries throughout the world; Nestlé USA, a US subsidiary; and Nestlé Ivory Coast, an Ivorian subsidiary.2 In a 2014
decision, the Ninth Circuit summarized some of the plaintiffs’
experiences:
They were forced to work on Ivorian cocoa plantations for up
to fourteen hours per day six days a week, given only scraps
of food to eat, and whipped and beaten by overseers. They
were locked in small rooms at night and not permitted to
leave the plantations, knowing that children who tried to escape would be beaten or tortured. Plaintiff John Doe II witnessed guards cut open the feet of children who attempted to
1
2

Doe v Nestle, S.A., 748 F Supp 2d 1057, 1064 (CD Cal 2010).
Id at 1063.
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escape, and John Doe III knew that the guards forced failed
escapees to drink urine.3
With respect to Nestlé, plaintiffs described Nestlé’s exclusive
supplier-buyer relationship with certain farms, arguing that
Nestlé thereby had “first hand knowledge of the widespread use
of child labor on [those] farms” and provided “money, supplies,
and training . . . knowing that their assistance would necessarily
facilitate child labor.”4
The plaintiffs in the ongoing Nestlé litigation relied on the
Alien Tort Statute5 (ATS), a one-sentence provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, to establish the US federal courts’ jurisdiction
over the case.6 In full, the ATS reads: “The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.”7 The vague terms of the ATS, along with its
lack of legislative history or early case law, have made its scope
and aim elusive.8 For almost two hundred years, litigants rarely
invoked the ATS, and courts have found few clues as to the First
Congress’s precise intent.9 As a result, judges and scholars’ interpretations have ranged widely. Depending on the account, the
ATS might broadly encompass “any intentional tort to an alien’s
person or personal property,”10 apply modestly to cases involving
foreign ambassadors, 11 or be restricted to cases of vessels captured during war.12
However, the ATS was successfully used to address violations
of international law beginning in the 1980s.13 Then, the Supreme
3

Doe I v Nestle USA, Inc, 766 F3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir 2014) (Nestle I).
Doe v Nestle, S.A., 748 F Supp 2d at 1066 (citation omitted).
5
1 Stat 73, 77 (1789), codified as amended at 28 USC § 1350.
6
Doe v Nestle, S.A., 748 F Supp 2d at 1062.
7
28 USC § 1350.
8
See, for example, Anthony J. Bellia Jr and Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths about
the Alien Tort Statute, 89 Notre Dame L Rev 1609, 1637–43 (2014); William R. Castro, The
Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of
Nations, 18 Conn L Rev 467, 467–68 (1986) (calling the ATS’s language “cryptic” and its
origin and purpose “obscure”).
9
Joe Lodico, Note, Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability under the Alien Tort
Statute, 30 J L & Commerce 117, 118 (2011). See also notes 28–32 and accompanying text.
10 Anthony J. Bellia Jr and Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law
of Nations, 78 U Chi L Rev 445, 446 (2011).
11 Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F2d 774, 813–15 (DC Cir 1984) (Bork
concurring).
12 Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18
Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 445, 447 (1995).
13 Bellia and Clark, 78 U Chi L Rev at 458 (cited in note 10).
4
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Court intervened in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain14 and Kiobel v Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co,15 each time restricting the scope of the ATS
and casting doubt on its future viability as a mechanism for promoting human rights.
In 2018, the Supreme Court restricted the ATS once more by
holding in Jesner v Arab Bank16 that foreign corporations cannot
be defendants in ATS suits.17 In the opinion, the Court also gave
a concise statement of the ATS’s purpose. In its view, that purpose is “to avoid foreign entanglements by ensuring the availability of a federal forum where the failure to provide one might cause
another nation to hold the United States responsible for an injury
to a foreign citizen.”18
Following Jesner, the Ninth Circuit issued its judgment in
Doe v Nestle, S.A.19 on appeal from the district court’s dismissal of
plaintiffs’ complaints. 20 The district court had previously concluded that the plaintiffs were seeking an extraterritorial application of the ATS in violation of the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Kiobel.21 Finding to the contrary, the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded to the district court.22 In light of Jesner, the Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs must be given an opportunity to
amend their complaint, and that “plaintiffs must remove those
defendants who are no longer amenable to suit under the ATS,
and specify which potentially liable party is responsible for what
culpable conduct.”23 At that point, plaintiffs had already conceded
in a supplemental brief that, “[a]s a result of Jesner, Plaintiffs’
claims against Nestlé, S.A. [and] Nestlé Ivory Coast . . . cannot
proceed and these parties should be dismissed.”24 While the case
may still proceed against Nestlé USA, the case will be substantially more difficult for the plaintiffs now that they must prove

14

542 US 692 (2004).
569 US 108 (2013).
16 138 S Ct 1386 (2018).
17 Id at 1403.
18 Id at 1397.
19 906 F3d 1120 (9th Cir 2018) (Nestle II).
20 Id at 1123.
21 Nestle v Nestle, S.A., 2017 WL 6059134, *8–9 (CD Cal). In Kiobel, the Court held
that there is a “presumption against extraterritoriality” in ATS cases. Kiobel, 569 US
at 117.
22 Nestle II, 906 F3d at 1127.
23 Id.
24 Appellants’ Supplemental Brief, Doe v Nestle, S.A., No 17-55435, *1 (9th Cir filed
May 18, 2018) (available on Westlaw at 2018 WL 2299135) (Doe Supplemental Brief).
15
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the liability of Nestlé USA specifically; after Jesner, proving culpable acts by Nestlé SA or Nestlé Ivory Coast will no longer
suffice.25
This Comment challenges the assumption that defendants
such as Nestlé SA and Nestlé Ivory Coast cannot be sued under
the ATS after Jesner. To do so, it explores the question of what
precisely qualifies as a “foreign corporation” for ATS purposes, especially with regard to transnational corporations.26 Part I provides an overview of the ATS’s historical and present application,
with special focus on the ruling in Jesner. It also considers the
open question whether ATS suits against any corporations are
permissible, and concludes that at least some jurisdictions are almost certain to continue allowing such suits. Part II turns to the
question of transnational corporate defendants, considering several possible ways to define foreign corporations and concluding
that a functional standard is best suited to accomplish the ATS’s
purposes as defined by Jesner.
Part III proposes a legal standard I call the Functional Foreignness Test, which determines if a corporation is foreign by asking whether the United States’ ties to the corporation are at least
as strong as the corporation’s ties to any other nation. This test
takes a holistic view of factors such as the nationality of corporate
actors and shareholders, the location of corporate facilities, and
the amount of business done in the United States. If this holistic
picture suggests that the corporation is as closely tied to the
25 This is merely one example of a growing trend of frustrated attempts to hold transnational corporations responsible for their wrongdoing, especially with regard to human
rights violations. As the world’s economy becomes more globalized, transnational corporations are increasingly prevalent and influential, and current legal frameworks are inadequate to keep these corporations in check. This backdrop of insufficient accountability
mechanisms for transnational corporations frames this Comment. For further discussion
of underregulated transnational corporations, see Gwynne L. Skinner, Expanding General
Personal Jurisdiction over Transnational Corporations, 121 Penn St L Rev 617, 651–67
(2017) (discussing the consequences of federal court decisions limiting personal jurisdiction over transnational corporations, especially with regard to human rights abuses);
Rachel J. Anderson, Reimagining Human Rights Law: Toward Global Regulation of
Transnational Corporations, 88 Denver U L Rev 183, 190–203 (2010) (describing the
weaknesses of current efforts to regulate the human rights violations of transnational corporations); Regina E. Rauxloh, A Call for the End of Impunity for Multinational Corporations, 14 Tex Wesleyan L Rev 297, 303–13 (2008) (explaining the shortcomings of international laws, national laws, and codes of conduct in addressing human rights violations of
transnational corporations).
26 This Comment uses the term “nondomestic” to refer to corporations that are not
incorporated in the United States, but which may or may not be “foreign” for ATS purposes. When used to apply to corporations, the word “foreign” will always imply foreignness for the purpose of the Jesner rule.
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United States as any other nation, the corporation fails the test
and should not be considered “foreign” for ATS purposes. In this
way, courts can apply the Jesner rule so as to better further the
ATS’s purpose of ensuring that US nationals will be held accountable for their actions, without allowing US courts to meddle in
other countries’ affairs. In addition, Part III discusses the way
that courts ought to view the parent-subsidiary relationship. I argue that for purposes of the Functional Foreignness Test, distinctions between parent companies and subsidiaries should be relevant only to the extent that they reflect the reality of corporate
activities. Otherwise, these sorts of legal fictions27 could render
the ATS impotent.
Next, Part III applies the Functional Foreignness Test to
Nestlé SA and Nestlé Ivory Coast. This demonstrates how the test
could provide the jurisdiction necessary to hold transnational corporations with strong ties to the United States responsible for severe violations of universal norms of international law. Finally, it
concludes by responding to a likely criticism of the Functional
Foreignness Test: that it violates the separation of powers by
making a policy decision properly left to Congress, especially
given that it implicates foreign relations.
In sum, this Comment argues that in spite of assumptions
made by certain lower courts and litigants, the rule announced in
Jesner need not be applied formalistically. A functional standard
that assesses a corporation’s operative ties to the United States
better serves the ATS’s purposes and addresses violations in a
principled way.
I. HISTORY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
This Part briefly summarizes the history of the ATS. First, it
provides an overview of the ATS’s promulgation, long history of
disuse, and recent emergence as a tool to address international
human rights violations, including the Supreme Court’s decisions

27 The idea that a corporate entity is a legal “person” entirely distinct from other
individuals or corporations is often referred to as a “legal fiction,” meaning a legal construct that does not truly reflect reality but is taken as true in applying the law. See
Skupski v Western Navigation Corp, 123 F Supp 309, 311 (SDNY 1954) (referring to “the
legal fiction of separate corporate entities”). This language of fiction derives largely from
International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945) (“[T]he corporate personality
is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact.”).
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in Sosa and Kiobel. Then, it turns to the Jesner decision, summarizing the Court’s reasoning for concluding that foreign corporations cannot be defendants in ATS suits.
A.

The ATS before Jesner

The First Congress passed the ATS in 1789 as part of the Judiciary Act, the original bill that established and organized the
federal judiciary.28 From 1789 until 1980, only two cases relied on
the ATS as a basis of jurisdiction, as noncitizens29 rarely brought
tort suits in US federal courts.30 As a result, there is little case
law from the ATS’s early days to shed light on its meaning. Further obscuring efforts at interpretation, as the Court pointed out
in Sosa, is the ATS’s “poverty of drafting history,” which has
meant that “modern commentators have necessarily concentrated
on the text” and “a consensus understanding of what Congress
intended has proven elusive.”31 Scholars have put forth various

28 See Paul Taylor, Congress’s Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the
First Congress and the First Federal Courts Can Teach Today’s Congress and Courts, 37
Pepperdine L Rev 847, 861–62 (2010) (describing the purpose of the Judiciary Act and the
First Congress’s intent not to vest federal courts with the full extent of jurisdiction permitted by Article III of the Constitution).
29 Even the precise meaning of the term “alien,” as used in the statute, is not entirely
clear. Some have argued that the term only includes noncitizen residents of the United
States, though this interpretation has failed to gain support in courts. Compare M.
Anderson Berry, Whether Foreigner or Alien: A New Look at the Original Language of the
Alien Tort Statute, 27 Berkeley J Intl L 316, 381 (2009) (arguing that “aliens” must reside
in the United States for ATS purposes), with Lizarbe v Rondon, 642 F Supp 2d 473, 492
(D Md 2009) (rejecting this interpretation and concluding that the Supreme Court disposed of this issue in Rasul v Bush, 542 US 466, 468 (2004), which stated, “the courts of
the United States have traditionally been open to nonresident aliens . . . . And indeed, [the
ATS] explicitly confers the privilege of suing . . . on aliens alone.”) (citations omitted). Instead, courts appear to implicitly accept the term “alien” to include any noncitizen regardless of residence. See, for example, Kiobel, 569 US at 113 (failing to discuss whether the
plaintiffs, former Nigerian residents turned legal permanent residents in the US, qualify
as “aliens,” despite a thorough argument against their “alien” status, in Supplemental
Brief of KBR, Inc, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Kiobel v Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co, No 10-1491, *16–21 (US filed Aug 8, 2012)); Sarei v Rio Tinto, 671 F3d 736
(9th Cir 2011) (permitting an ATS claim by residents of Papua New Guinea without addressing the question of whether they qualify as “aliens”).
30 See Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v Clift, 195 F Supp 857, 865 (D Md 1961) (relying
on the ATS for jurisdiction in a child custody case); Bolchos v Darrel, 3 F Cases 810, 810
(DSC 1795) (referring to the ATS as an alternative ground of jurisdiction in a case involving a dispute over the ownership of slaves). See also Developments in the Law: Extraterritoriality, 124 Harv L Rev 1226, 1235 (2011); Bellia and Clark, 78 U Chi L Rev at 458 (cited
in note 10).
31 Sosa, 542 US at 718–19.
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historical arguments for differing interpretations of the ATS. 32
Theories of congressional intent include goals such as protecting
foreign diplomats, establishing jurisdiction over prize cases arising from wartime captures of merchant vessels, addressing violations of “safe-conducts or passports” in cases when foreigners
were under the protection of the state, enabling the United States
to take responsibility for certain violations of international law,
or providing universal jurisdiction over a class of particular
breaches of the law of nations.33
The use of the ATS changed dramatically in 1980, when litigants began to explore the possibility of using the statute as a tool
for enforcing international human rights law. This transition was
marked by the landmark case of Filartiga v Pena-Irala,34 in which
the Second Circuit used the ATS to establish jurisdiction over a
case in which Paraguayan citizens sued another Paraguayan citizen for causing their son’s death through torture.35 Filartiga was
the first case in which noncitizens used the ATS to sue other
noncitizens for events that occurred outside US territory.36 Following Filartiga, a circuit split arose regarding the use of the ATS
for cases in which neither the parties nor the conduct at issue
were tied to the United States.37

32 Kedar S. Bhatia, Comment, Reconsidering the Purely Jurisdictional View of the
Alien Tort Statute, 27 Emory Intl L Rev 447, 453 (2013) (“The intent of the First Congress
remains unclear despite the attention of judges and legal scholars.”).
33 Jennifer K. Elsea, The Alien Tort Statute: Legislative History and Executive
Branch Views *8–11 (Congressional Research Service, Oct 2, 2003), archived at
http://perma.cc/7YF4-QK3L; Bellia and Clark, 78 U Chi L Rev at 465 (cited in note 10)
(arguing that the ATS was designed to ensure that the United States could redress harms
caused to foreigners by US citizens, in order to avoid reprisals by other nations); Thomas
H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 Colum L Rev 830, 879–82
(2006) (arguing that the ATS was exclusively designed to target violations of “safe
conducts”).
34 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).
35 Id at 878, 887.
36 Bellia and Clark, 78 U Chi L Rev at 459–60 (cited in note 10).
37 Compare Abebe-Jira v Negewo, 72 F3d 844, 847–48 (11th Cir 1996) (affirming a
judgment against a former Ethiopian government official for torture and other cruel acts
against former Ethiopian prisoners); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights
Litigation, 25 F3d 1467, 1475–76 (9th Cir 1994) (affirming a judgment against a former
president of the Philippines for acts of torture, summary execution, and disappearance of
Philippine citizens), with Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F2d 774 (DC Cir 1984)
(per curiam) (dismissing a claim by Israeli citizens against a Palestinian organization allegedly involved in an armed attack abroad, with two of three concurring judges rejecting
Filartiga).
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Scholars also disputed whether Filartiga’s interpretation of
the ATS was appropriate.38 Some applauded the decision’s willingness to take a more expansive view of international human
rights law and the role of US courts in applying it. In one of the
first articles providing a comprehensive analysis of the case, Professors Jeffrey Blum and Ralph Steinhardt concluded by calling
it a “victory for human rights activists” and emphasizing the positive impact it could have both domestically and internationally.39
They described Filartiga as a commendable shift toward accepting the legitimacy of international custom and away from the dichotomy between binding and nonbinding treaties. 40 Similarly,
Professor Jack Garvey offered an endorsement of the “international tort” model for addressing international human rights violations, praising its ability to redress such injuries in a manner
that avoids “parochialism” by relying on substantive international law.41 Elsewhere, the Filartiga court was called “a court educated in modern international law, which recognized its constitutional authority and responsibility to apply that law in
appropriate cases.”42 These positive reactions sometimes echoed
and drew legitimacy from a brief submitted by the Department of
Justice in the case, which stated that “a refusal to recognize a
private cause of action in these circumstances might seriously
damage the credibility of our nation’s commitment to the protection of human rights.”43
By contrast, others condemned Filartiga as inappropriately
expanding the United States’ role in policing human rights violations abroad, especially given that the decision came from the

38 For a summary of favorable and unfavorable reactions to Filartiga, see Karen E.
Holt, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala after Ten Years: Major Breakthrough or Legal Oddity?, 20 Ga
J Intl & Comp L 543, 546–54 (1990). See also Bellia and Clark, 78 U Chi L Rev at 460–61
(cited in note 10) (summarizing conflicting responses to Filartiga and collecting sources).
39 Jeffrey M. Blum and Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 Harv
Intl L J 53, 112–13 (1981).
40 Id at 74.
41 Jack I. Garvey, Repression of the Political Émigré—The Underground to International Law: A Proposal for Remedy, 90 Yale L J 78, 119 (1980).
42 Kathryn Burke, et al, Application of International Human Rights Law in State
and Federal Courts, 18 Tex Intl L J 291, 321 (1983).
43 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v Pena-Irala,
No 79-6090, *22–23 (2d Cir filed June 6, 1980) (available on Westlaw at 1980 WL 340146).
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courts rather than the political branches.44 One commentator criticized the decision as “miss[ing] the point” of international human
rights law, which should be “making the home government answerable before domestic legal tribunals,” rather than “prosecut[ing] a foreign state” from afar.45 One article, though offering
a generally favorable view of Filartiga, nonetheless noted that it
was “bound to evoke resentment abroad as an act of moral imperialism.”46 Others raised concerns that the ruling would discourage commerce with the United States, or do “more harm
than good” by providing an illusory remedy that would likely be
unenforceable.47
In 2004, the Supreme Court interpreted the ATS for the first
time in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain. In Sosa, the Court concluded
that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of
action.”48 However, it clarified that this interpretation did not indicate that the ATS, when passed, was merely “a jurisdictional
convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress.”49 The Court reasoned instead that Congress designed the
ATS to be immediately applicable only in cases involving a narrow class of torts that violated international law and were recognized at common law at the time of the ATS’s enactment.50 This
is not to say that the possible causes of action would be forever
limited to those that existed in 1789. Rather, the Court merely
established that the ATS was immediately operative and could
serve as a basis for jurisdiction, in conjunction with the common
law, without requiring an additional statute creating a cause of
action.51
Courts have distilled Sosa’s reasoning into a two-part test to
determine whether a given cause of action exists under the ATS.
First, courts must answer a “threshold question whether a plaintiff can demonstrate that the alleged violation is of a norm that is
44 See, for example, Mark P. Jacobsen, Case Note, 28 U.S.C. 1350: A Legal Remedy
for Torture in Paraguay?, 69 Georgetown L J 833, 846 (1981) (“[T]he effect of the decision
was to intrude upon the foreign affairs powers of the President and the Senate.”).
45 Farooq Hassan, A Conflict of Philosophies: The Filartiga Jurisprudence, 32 Intl &
Comp L Q 250, 257–58 (1983).
46 C. Donald Johnson Jr, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: A Contribution to the Development
of Customary International Law by a Domestic Court, 11 Ga J Intl & Comp L 335,
340 (1981).
47 Holt, 20 Ga J Intl & Comp L at 552–53 (cited in note 38).
48 Sosa, 542 US at 724.
49 Id at 719.
50 Id at 714, 720.
51 Id at 724.
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specific, universal, and obligatory.”52 Next, the court must decide
“whether allowing this case to proceed under the ATS is a proper
exercise of judicial discretion, or instead whether caution requires
the political branches to grant specific authority before [ ] liability
can be imposed.”53 With this reasoning in Sosa, emphasizing judicial restraint and deference to the political branches, the Court
suggested a more cautious application of the ATS than lower
courts had been applying in cases such as Filartiga.
Almost a decade later, the Supreme Court took this restraint
a step further by adding a territorial requirement to ATS suits.54
Nigerian residents of an area called Ogoniland had brought suit
against British, Dutch, and Nigerian corporations.55 According to
the complaint, when plaintiffs protested environmental damage
caused by defendants’ activities in Ogoniland, defendants “enlisted the Nigerian Government to violently suppress the burgeoning demonstrations,” which led to military and police forces
“beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents and destroying
or looting property,” allegedly with various forms of aid from defendant corporations.56 In Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, the
Court held that ATS suits cannot be sustained when “all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States.”57 Notably,
the Court did not preclude all cases regarding extraterritorial
conduct, but merely determined that a presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the ATS, such that in cases that “touch
and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so
with sufficient force to displace” that presumption. 58 So while
Kiobel certainly ended ATS litigation for cases such as Filartiga,
it still left open questions regarding the precise contours of ATS
jurisdiction.
Following Sosa and Kiobel, the Supreme Court had substantially curtailed the use of the ATS as an international human
rights tool, disappointing those who saw Filartiga as ushering
in a new era of universal jurisdiction over international law
violations. However, the Court had not entirely precluded ATS
52

Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1399 (Kennedy) (plurality) (quotation marks omitted).
Id.
54 Kiobel, 569 US at 124 (“We therefore conclude that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts
that presumption.”).
55 Id at 111–12.
56 Id at 113.
57 Id at 124.
58 Kiobel, 569 US at 124–25.
53
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jurisdiction over cases involving conduct abroad, nor cases involving foreign defendants. These issues would come to the fore once
more in Jesner.
B.

Jesner v Arab Bank

In June 2018, the Court made its third and most recent ruling
on the ATS in Jesner v Arab Bank. Jesner involved a class action
suit in which roughly six thousand plaintiffs59 sued Arab Bank, a
major Jordanian corporation.60 The plaintiffs alleged that some of
its officials “allowed the Bank to be used to transfer funds to terrorist groups in the Middle East, which in turn enabled or facilitated criminal acts of terrorism.”61 In an attempt to satisfy the
requirement set in Kiobel, plaintiffs also alleged that Arab Bank
used a branch in New York—its single branch in the United
States—to “clear dollar-denominated transactions through the
Clearing House Interbank Payments System.”62 To put this allegation more simply, plaintiffs claimed that an automated processing system in Arab Bank’s New York branch, which processes
about 440,000 transactions each day, was involved in the transactions that benefited terrorist groups outside the United
States.63 Unsurprisingly, the Court noted the tenuous connection
to US territory.64 However, the Court did not dismiss the case for
failure to displace the Kiobel presumption against extraterritoriality. Instead, it issued a blanket holding that foreign corporations cannot be defendants in ATS suits.65
The Court’s categorical denial of jurisdiction was based on
two interrelated arguments. First, the ATS’s purpose is to hold
US actors accountable for injuries to foreign nationals in order to

59 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Jesner v Arab Bank, No 16-499, *ii (US filed Oct
5, 2016) (Jesner Cert Petition).
60 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1393.
61 Id.
62 Id at 1394.
63 Id at 1395.
64 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1406 (“[T]he relatively minor connection between the terrorist
attacks at issue in this case and the alleged conduct in the United States well illustrates
the perils of extending the scope of ATS liability to foreign multinational corporations like
Arab Bank.”).
65 Id at 1407. Parts of Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion in Jesner were for a plurality of three justices; there were also three concurrences and a dissent. This Comment
focuses on the holding and the reasoning of the parts of Justice Kennedy’s opinion that
obtained a majority.
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reduce diplomatic friction,66 and the ATS should therefore not enable cases likely to cause such friction.67 For example, the Court
noted that the Jesner litigation had been going on for thirteen
years, during which it “caused significant diplomatic tensions
with Jordan, a critical ally . . . [that] considers the instant litigation to be a grave affront to its sovereignty.”68 Second, cases such
as these, which implicate sensitive issues of international relations, are best left to Congress.69
Regarding Congress’s purpose in enacting the ATS, a subject
that has frequently been a topic of dispute among courts and legal
scholars,70 Jesner gives a concise formulation: “The principal objective of the statute, when first enacted, was to avoid foreign entanglements by ensuring the availability of a federal forum where
the failure to provide one might cause another nation to hold the
United States responsible for an injury to a foreign citizen.”71 In
other words, the ATS aims to hold US actors responsible for injuries to foreign citizens in order to avoid diplomatic problems with
other countries. Given this guiding objective, the Court noted that
expansive ATS jurisdiction of the Filartiga variety had drawn
criticism from abroad, indicating that such suits undermine the
ATS’s goal by causing diplomatic tensions rather than alleviating
them.72 Indeed, previous ATS suits have caused diplomatic strife.
66 Id at 1397 (explaining that “[t]he principal objective of the [ATS], when first enacted, was to avoid foreign entanglements”).
67 Id at 1406.
68 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1406–07.
69 Id at 1402–03. It is common for courts and scholars to make similar arguments
suggesting that the judiciary should avoid interfering with foreign relations or offending
foreign sovereigns. See, for example, Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing
Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L J 1170, 1177 (2007):

Courts are alert to the risks of creating international tensions, and in many
cases they seem to be making a presumptive judgment that deferring to the interests of foreign sovereigns produces benefits for Americans that outweigh the
costs. . . . [C]ourts should play a smaller role than they currently do in interpreting statutes that touch on foreign relations.
See also Sosa, 542 US at 727–28.
70 See, for example, Mirela V. Hristova, The Alien Tort Statute: A Vehicle for Implementing the United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights and Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility, 47 USF L Rev 89, 95 (2012) (“[T]here is no record
of legislative debate on [the ATS’s] purpose and ‘consensus of what Congress intended has
proven elusive.’”), quoting Sosa, 542 US at 718–19.
71 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1397.
72 Id at 1398. Scholars have raised similar concerns regarding diplomatic consequences of ATS suits. See, for example, Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Nicholas K. Mitrokostas,
International Implications of the Alien Tort Statute, 16 St Thomas L Rev 607, 613 (2004)
(“ATS decisions following Filartiga, . . . may seriously damage United States relations
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For instance, Chinese citizens brought a series of ATS suits in
response to the Chinese government’s crackdown against the
Falun Gong spiritual movement in 1999.73 The Chinese government denounced the lawsuits, complained to US officials, and
suggested the suits would cause “immeasurable interferences”
with diplomatic relations.74
In addition to its concern regarding diplomatic friction, the
Jesner Court cited its “general reluctance to extend judicially created private rights of action” as a reason for dismissing the suit.75
The Court described various recent cases in which the Court refrained from establishing rights of action.76 It reasoned that “the
Legislature is in the better position to consider if the public interest would be served by imposing a new substantive legal liability”
and, therefore, “if there are sound reasons to think Congress
might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy, . . .
courts must refrain from creating the remedy in order to respect
the role of Congress.”77 The Court noted that this rule of deference
has been applied to reject the expansion of an already-existing
cause of action—specifically, liability under Bivens—to corporate
defendants.78 Adding that such concerns apply with special weight
in cases that implicate foreign relations, the Court concluded that
“absent further action from Congress it would be inappropriate
for courts to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations.”79
By precluding ATS suits against foreign corporations, Jesner
struck another blow to advocates who seek to use the ATS as a
tool for combatting human rights violations abroad. In addition
to the thousands of Jesner plaintiffs who failed to obtain any relief
and the Nestlé litigants who are no longer pursuing claims
against Nestlé SA or Nestlé Ivory Coast, other plaintiffs have also
with foreign states, obstruct Executive policymaking, and reverse the effects of international trade and investment liberalization.”).
73 Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 Wash U L Rev
1117, 1152–53 (2011).
74 Id at 1153, quoting Doe v Qi, 349 F Supp 2d 1258, 1300 (ND Cal 2004). However,
Professor Robert Knowles notes that there is no evidence that the suits actually affected
Chinese policy or sentiment toward the United States. Knowles, 88 Wash U L Rev at 1154
(cited in note 73).
75 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1402.
76 Id at 1402, citing Sosa, 542 US at 727.
77 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1402.
78 Id at 1403. Bivens actions were established by Bivens v Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Court created a
private cause of action for a narrow set of claims regarding constitutional rights violations
by individual government agents. Id at 395–97.
79 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1403.

2019]

Legal Fictions and Foreign Frictions

2207

dropped defendants from suits following Jesner.80 Moreover, international human rights violations by corporations across the
world are widespread and notoriously difficult to punish. 81 For
instance, in its 2018 report, the Corporate Human Rights
Benchmark found that of 101 of the world’s largest companies in
human-rights-risk sectors, 82 48 had been the subject of serious
allegations of human rights violations between January 2015 and
December 2017.83 These allegations concerned violations such as
forced labor, child labor, and infringements on rights to land, livelihood, and water.84 The report found that in a majority of cases,
companies failed to take any appropriate action in response. 85
The ATS might have helped to fill this accountability gap, but
Jesner limits the statute’s reach with respect to many corporate
defendants.
Jesner also left a number of important questions unresolved.
Most strikingly, it did not answer the question whether corporations in general may be named as ATS defendants. Though the
petition for a writ of certiorari presented the single question of
“[w]hether the Alien Tort Statute categorically forecloses corporate liability,”86 and the Court discussed a number of lower court
decisions ruling for or against corporate liability, 87 the Court

80 See, for example, Kaplan v Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 F3d
501, 515 (DC Cir 2018) (relying on Jesner to dismiss another case alleging funding of terrorist activities by a foreign bank).
81 For sources discussing inadequate accountability mechanisms for transnational
corporations, see note 25.
82 The report considers companies in the agricultural, apparel, and extractive
industries.
83 Corporate Human Rights Benchmark, 2018 Key Findings: Apparel, Agricultural
Products and Extractives Companies *44 (2018), archived at http://perma.cc/3UL2-3Q6G
(CHRB Report).
84 Id at *45.
85 Id at *46. The report measures “appropriate action” by considering whether companies “engaged in dialogue with the allegedly impacted stakeholders,” “[took] appropriate
actions to address the alleged impact,” or “demonstrate[d] improvements in the related
management systems to reduce such impacts in the future.” Id. When allegations were
denied, the report considered whether companies “show[ed] [ ] participation in engagement efforts” or “disclose[d] reviews of related management systems.” None of these actions were taken in 57 percent of allegations. Id.
86 Jesner Cert Petition at *i (citation omitted) (cited in note 59).
87 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1395–96 (discussing the Second Circuit’s determination that
the ATS does not extend to suits against corporations, but noting that the Seventh, Ninth,
and DC Circuits had all disagreed), citing Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 631 F3d
111, 120 (2d Cir 2010); Flomo v Firestone Natural Rubber Co, 643 F3d 1013, 1017–21 (7th
Cir 2011); Nestle I, 766 F3d at 1020–22; Doe VIII v Exxon Mobil Corp, 654 F3d 11, 40–55
(DC Cir 2011) (Exxon Mobil).
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nonetheless limited its holding to foreign corporations. Additionally, as this Comment argues, the Court left open the question of
what, precisely, makes a corporation “foreign” for ATS purposes.
C.

Corporate Defendants in ATS Suits after Jesner

This Comment does not focus on whether ATS suits against
corporations are permissible in the first place, as this question
has been extensively debated elsewhere.88 Instead, it addresses
when, if corporations are indeed permissible ATS defendants,
transnational corporations that are neither wholly domestic nor
wholly foreign may be defendants in ATS suits. However, because
corporations must generally be permissible defendants for this argument to have any relevance, this Comment briefly discusses
why ATS suits against corporations are likely to survive after
Jesner, at least for domestic corporations.
The question whether corporations can be ATS defendants is
really two inquiries: whether there is corporate liability for the
causes of action that give rise to ATS suits, and whether the ATS
extends jurisdiction over cases involving corporate defendants.
Before Jesner, courts focused on the first inquiry and viewed it as
either a procedural question or a question of substantive international law. According to the former view, the ATS provides subject
matter jurisdiction and international law provides the cause of
action, but the court is free to allow or reject corporate liability
according to its own procedures.89 According to the latter view, the
ATS provides the subject matter jurisdiction over particular
causes of action established by international law,90 and corporate
liability depends on whether there is an international law norm
of corporate liability for that cause of action.91

88 See, for example, Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability under the
Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 Va J Intl L 353, 364–77
(2011) (summarizing the history of corporate ATS liability jurisprudence and scholarship);
Dustin Cooper, Comment, Aliens among Us: Factors to Determine Whether Corporations
Should Face Prosecution in U.S. Courts for Their Actions Overseas, 77 La L Rev 513,
522 (2016).
89 See, for example, Exxon Mobil, 654 F3d at 41–42 (allowing corporate liability because corporate liability is a procedural rather than substantive question).
90 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1399 (Kennedy) (plurality) (restating rule that ATS provides
jurisdiction over suits arising from specific, universal, and obligatory norms of international law).
91 See, for example, Flomo, 643 F3d at 1017–21 (allowing corporate liability because
it is a norm of international law); Kiobel, 621 F3d at 120 (concluding that there is no international norm of corporate liability, and therefore precluding corporate ATS liability).
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Jesner, however, addressed the second inquiry: whether the
ATS extends jurisdiction to cases involving corporate defendants.
The Jesner Court precluded a class of defendants by reference to
the ATS’s specific purpose, 92 meaning that it found a jurisdictional limitation inherent in the statute.93 This inherent jurisdictional limit could potentially extend to all cases involving corporate defendants. 94 In this manner, Jesner adds an additional
condition for suits against corporations to succeed: the statute
must provide jurisdiction over such suits and corporate liability
must be permissible for the particular cause of action according
to either the court’s procedure or international law norms, depending on which side of the pre-Jesner debate is taken. This Section considers generally whether a corporation can be named as a
defendant in an ATS suit. This includes both the jurisdictional
question raised by Jesner and the corporate liability question that
has long been subject to debate.
Before Jesner, most circuits that ruled on the question of corporate ATS liability concluded that corporate liability is permitted. The Eleventh Circuit was the first to explicitly state this rule
in Romero v Drummond Co.95 The Seventh, Ninth, and DC Circuits followed, with only the Second Circuit ruling against such
liability.96 In resolving the issue of corporate liability under the
ATS, courts took one of the two approaches described above. Some
courts viewed the question of corporate liability as a procedural
question separate from international law, and therefore simply
applied their own procedures regarding corporate liability for the
type of tort at issue. Other courts looked to international law,
which must be violated in an ATS suit, and considered whether
corporate liability exists under international law for the given
cause of action. The Second Circuit took the latter approach.97 It

92

Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1403.
Sosa, 542 US at 724 (explaining that “the ATS is solely jurisdictional”).
94 At least one court has interpreted Jesner as precluding corporate ATS liability
entirely. See Freeman v HSBC Holdings PLC, 2018 WL 3616845, *18 n 35 (EDNY).
95 552 F3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir 2008).
96 Compare Flomo, 643 F3d at 1017–21 (concluding that corporate liability is a norm
of international law and is therefore appropriate for ATS purposes); Sarei, 671 F3d at 765
(“We . . . conclude that international law extends the scope of liability for war crimes to all
actors, including corporations.”); Exxon Mobil, 654 F3d at 41–42 (allowing corporate liability because corporate liability is a procedural rather than substantive question, such
that it is unsound to ask whether such liability is a norm of international law), with Kiobel,
621 F3d at 120 (concluding that there is no international norm of corporate liability, and
therefore precluding corporate ATS liability).
97 See Kiobel, 621 F3d at 120.
93
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argued that customary international law determines the scope of
ATS liability, and concluded that no sufficiently “specific, universal, and obligatory” norm of corporate liability exists in international law, invoking the high standard set by Sosa.98
The Seventh, Ninth, and DC Circuits also approached corporate liability as an international law question, but reached the
opposite conclusion. In Flomo v Firestone Natural Rubber Co,99
for instance, the Seventh Circuit discussed the issue extensively
and found that corporate liability is indeed a norm of customary
international law.100 The Ninth Circuit took the same approach
and reached the same conclusion.101 This argument draws strength
from successful lawsuits brought after World War II, under the
authority of international law, against corporations that assisted
the Nazi regime.102
The DC Circuit, meanwhile, approached the question as one
of procedure. It reasoned that international law does not define
the scope of liability, which is a question of remedy rather than of
substantive prohibition.103 As the court put it, “[t]here is no right
to sue under the law of nations,” and therefore it is unsound to
ask whether there is a right to sue corporations under customary
international law.104
Scholars, too, have made arguments taking either or both of
these approaches to support or reject corporate ATS liability.105
While these different arguments for and against corporate liability are distinct from Jesner’s jurisdictional ruling and the argument of this Comment, they help to illuminate the complex history and doctrine surrounding the question of permissible ATS
defendants.

98

Id at 136, 141.
643 F3d 1013 (7th Cir 2011).
100 Id at 1017–21.
101 See Sarei, 671 F3d at 765 (“We . . . conclude that international law extends the
scope of liability for war crimes to all actors, including corporations.”), vacd for reconsideration under Kiobel by Rio Tinto PLC v Sarei, 569 US 945 (2013), all claims dismissed,
722 F3d 1109 (9th Cir 2013). Though this decision was vacated and the complaint dismissed following Kiobel, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its conclusions regarding corporate
ATS liability in Nestle I, 766 F3d at 1022.
102 Flomo, 643 F3d at 1017.
103 Exxon Mobil, 654 F3d at 41.
104 Id at 42.
105 See generally, for example, Daniel Prince, Corporate Liability for International
Torts: Did the Second Circuit Misinterpret the Alien Tort Statute?, 8 Seton Hall Cir Rev
43 (2011).
99
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Although Jesner does not resolve the issue of corporate liability under the ATS, it does contain language that appears skeptical of whether the ATS extends jurisdiction to cases with corporate defendants. The Jesner Court emphasized deference to
Congress in questions of international relations as well as judicial
restraint in extending private causes of action. If this reasoning
led to a blanket ban on corporate defendants, this would establish
another inherent limitation of the ATS rather than follow the
Second Circuit’s holding based on its interpretation of international law.
However, the goal of reducing diplomatic friction provides a
compelling rationale to treat domestic corporations differently
from foreign ones. Holding foreign corporations accountable for
acts that harm non-US citizens meddles in foreign affairs and is
therefore likely to cause diplomatic friction. Yet, at the same time,
failing to hold corporations with ties to the United States responsible for their actions against foreign nationals could have the
same effect.106 As a result, the reading of Jesner most consistent
with its interpretation of the ATS does not suggest that a narrow
application of the ATS is always better. Rather, courts should assess whether, by allowing a certain class of defendants, the court
is holding the United States responsible for the actions of its nationals or simply meddling in the affairs of other nations.
Following Jesner, courts that have ruled on the question of
suits against corporate ATS defendants have continued to permit
them—at least against domestic corporations. The Ninth Circuit
did so in the Nestlé litigation,107 and several district courts have
done the same.108 The US District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia, for instance, reasoned that when a suit “involves foreign plaintiffs suing an American corporate defendant,” the case
“fully aligns with the original goals of the ATS: to provide a

106 Throughout this Comment, I discuss the United States’ responsibility with regard
to corporate activities. I do not mean to suggest that the US government itself is connected
to these activities. Rather, I am referring to a government’s responsibility for the acts of
its nationals—including the obligation to make reparations for torts or crimes committed
by those nationals—which I argue ought to apply to corporations as well.
107 Nestle II, 906 F3d at 1124 (“Jesner did not eliminate all corporate liability under
the ATS, and we therefore continue to follow Nestle I’s holding [permitting corporate liability] as applied to domestic corporations.”).
108 See Estate of Alvarez v Johns Hopkins University, 2019 WL 95572, *9 (D Md); Al
Shimari v CACI Premier Technology, Inc, 320 F Supp 3d 781, 787 (ED Va 2018); Nahl v
Jaoude, 354 F Supp 3d 489, 506 (SDNY 2018).
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federal forum for tort suits by aliens against Americans for international law violations.”109 The court added, “because [the defendant] is an American, rather than a foreign, corporation, there is
no risk that holding [the defendant] liable would offend any foreign government.” 110 Notably, other district courts have barred
ATS suits against corporations following Jesner.111 However, it is
clear that Jesner has not definitively resolved this debate, and
that ATS suits against corporations will continue in some jurisdictions, at least for domestic corporate defendants.
Given that Jesner has not brought an end to ATS suits
against corporations generally, lower courts that permit such
suits must now draw a distinction between foreign corporations
that are not amenable to suit and other corporations that are.
This raises a novel question, which this Comment seeks to
answer: For the purposes of the ATS, what counts as a foreign
corporation?
II. ATS SUITS AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
In several cases—including in the Nestlé litigation—plaintiffs have dropped certain defendants from their complaints in response to the Jesner holding without pausing to interpret it.112
They appear to assume that whether a corporation is foreign for
ATS purposes can be readily determined based on its place of incorporation. Yet it is not clear that such a formalistic rule need
apply. The distinction between foreign and domestic corporations
has not been significant in previous ATS suits, so there is no established definition of “foreign corporation” for ATS purposes.
Moreover, different sources of law suggest different possible definitions that could be applied. 113 This Comment therefore challenges the assumption that “foreign corporation” must be defined
109

Al Shimari, 320 F Supp 3d at 787.
Id.
111 See Wildhaber v EFV, 2018 WL 3069264, *6 (SD Fl); Freeman v HSBC Holdings
PLC, 2018 WL 3616845, *18 n 35 (EDNY); Nahl, 354 F Supp 3d at 497.
112 Doe Supplemental Brief at *1 (cited in note 24); Wildhaber, 2018 WL 3069264
at *2.
113 For instance, a corporation’s citizenship for diversity purposes is determined by
both its place of incorporation and its principal place of business. 28 USC § 1332. However,
whether a corporation “resides” in a given place for the purpose of the general venue statute depends on whether it is subject to personal jurisdiction there, which is determined
through a more flexible test. 28 USC § 1391(c). For the purpose of federal alienage diversity jurisdiction, a corporation has the nationality of “the state under the laws of which
the corporation is organized,” a formulation that follows international law. JPMorgan
Chase Bank v Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd, 536 US 88, 91–92 (2002). Some of
110
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formalistically for ATS purposes. I argue that a functional approach based on a holistic assessment of a corporation’s ties to the
United States better advances the purposes of the ATS and is
more aligned with Jesner’s reasoning.
This Part proceeds in three sections. First, it outlines some of
the existing safeguards that limit the scope of the ATS in order to
give context to the Jesner rule and show that concerns about expanding ATS liability are often overstated. With these safeguards
in mind, I turn to whether the ATS is better served by a formalistic rule or a functional standard for the definition of foreign corporation. Drawing on analogous areas of law, I argue that formalistic rules for determining corporate nationality are inappropriate
for the ATS. Then, I draw on personal jurisdiction doctrine to
show that a functional standard is more appropriate. Such a
standard more accurately promotes the ATS’s urgent and sensitive foreign relations goals.
A.

Existing Safeguards against Jurisdictional Overreach in
ATS Suits

A number of existing safeguards already prevent ATS suits
from overreaching and meddling in foreign affairs. As a result,
many of the goals underlying the Jesner rule against foreign corporate defendants are largely addressed by other limitations on
ATS suits. This Section provides a brief overview of those limitations in order to show that an overly cautious interpretation of
the Jesner rule is unnecessary.
First, courts have interpreted the ATS to apply only to a limited set of violations of international law: the international norm
giving rise to the suit must be “specific, universal, and obligatory.”114 This sets a high bar, limiting ATS suits to cases such as
genocide, war crimes, and torture.115 By contrast, ATS suits have
not been permitted to address “crimes against humanity arising

these rules, which could provide guidance for the application of Jesner, will be discussed
in more detail in Parts II.B and II.C.
114 Kiobel, 569 US at 109.
115 See Sarei v Rio Tinto PLC, 671 F3d 736, 758, 763 (9th Cir 2011) (genocide, war
crimes); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F3d 1467, 1475
(9th Cir 1994) (torture).
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from a food and medical blockade,”116 “systematic racial discrimination,”117 or violations of free speech,118 among others. As a result, no matter how far the United States extends ATS jurisdiction with respect to permissible defendants, the ATS will still be
limited to a small class of cases because it only applies to rare,
egregious incidents. Additionally, the concern that the United
States is overreaching must always be weighed against the high
stakes on the other side: in any ATS suit, an extreme violation
such as genocide or war crimes has allegedly occurred, and
the perpetrators may escape liability if the ATS suit is not
permitted.119
Next, the Kiobel rule already precludes suits based on events
that took place outside US territory, except when they “touch and
concern” US territory with “sufficient force to displace” the presumption against extraterritoriality. 120 So cases in which the
United States might be accused of meddling in the affairs of other
countries are already likely to be barred as ATS suits. For instance, Jesner would likely have been dismissed under the Kiobel
rule even if the Court had not chosen to create a new rule regarding foreign corporations. The actual acts of terrorism at issue in
Jesner occurred overseas, and the only connection to the United
States was an extremely tenuous link based on automated processes that technically occurred at the New York branch.121
Another important safeguard against overzealous assertions
of the US courts’ jurisdiction is forum non conveniens.122 Violations giving rise to ATS suits, especially those regarding conduct

116

Sarei, 671 F3d at 767.
Id at 768.
118 See Guinto v Marcos, 654 F Supp 276, 280 (SD Cal 1986).
119 As discussed below, ATS suits should be dismissed under forum non conveniens if
a court closer to the location of the violations would be more appropriate. Furthermore,
though some international and regional tribunals do address some violations of international law, their capacity to hear cases and enforce judgments is severely limited. For instance, some bodies only hear cases between states or that are referred by states, while
others hear only a small number of cases per year. See Emilie Hafner-Burton, Making
Human Rights a Reality 36–40 (Princeton 2013) (providing an overview of international
and regional courts). For a discussion of limited enforcement, see generally Gwen P.
Barnes, Note, The International Criminal Court’s Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms:
The Indictment of President Omar Al Bashir, 34 Fordham Intl L J 1584 (2011). Depending
on these tribunals would fall far short of the ATS’s goal of ensuring an available forum.
Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1397.
120 Kiobel, 569 US at 124–25.
121 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1394.
122 Black’s Law Dictionary 770 (West 10th ed 2014):
117

2019]

Legal Fictions and Foreign Frictions

2215

outside the United States perpetrated by non-US actors, would
often be better addressed by local courts in the affected communities. When such redress is possible, ATS suits ought to be dismissed under forum non conveniens.123 Forum non conveniens is
the principle that even if jurisdiction exists, courts may decline to
hear a case in favor of a more convenient forum.124
In Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert,125 the Supreme Court listed various factors relevant to a consideration of forum non conveniens.126
These include factors relating to the “private interest of the litigant,” such as the various practical problems and costs of litigating in a faraway place.127 They also include “[f]actors of public interest,” including the consideration that “[i]n cases which touch
the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial
in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country.” 128 This last consideration alone would likely end any ATS
suit in which the underlying controversy could plausibly be dealt
with by a country more closely tied to it. This is especially true
given that issues as large as government-sponsored torture or
genocide implicate entire communities, and these communities
deserve to be close to the trials for those injuries if possible.
Though there is some debate over whether forum non conveniens
should apply to ATS suits, 129 this Comment assumes that it is
among the available tools courts can use to limit ATS overreach

The doctrine that an appropriate forum—even though competent under the
law—may divest itself of jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants and
the witnesses, it appears that the action should proceed in another forum in
which the action might also have been properly brought in the first place.
123 See Kiobel, 569 US at 139 (Breyer concurring) (proposing a jurisdictional approach
to the ATS that relies on doctrines including forum non conveniens to limit the risk of
overreach). See also Aric K. Short, Is the Alien Tort Statute Sacrosanct? Retaining Forum
Non Conveniens in Human Rights Litigation, 33 NYU J Intl L & Polit 1001, 1053 (2001)
(“[T]he doctrine of forum non conveniens provides a useful check on the possible overextension of federal court subject matter jurisdiction in cases with few meaningful ties to the
United States.”); Jonathan C. Drimmer and Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 Berkeley J Intl
L 456, 471 (2011) (“[C]ourts often still dismiss ATS cases on forum non conveniens
grounds.”).
124 See, for example, Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert, 330 US 501, 507 (1947).
125 330 US 501 (1947).
126 Id at 508.
127 Id at 508–09.
128 Id at 509.
129 See generally Short, 33 NYU J Intl L & Polit 1001 (cited in note 123).
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in appropriate cases, without resorting to blanket rules like the
one pronounced in Jesner.130
In Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno,131 the Supreme Court made it
clear that a lack of available redress in the more convenient forum
would only overcome forum non conveniens in extreme cases.132
In Piper Aircraft, plaintiffs brought suit in a US district court regarding a plane crash that occurred in Scotland.133 Given various
practical concerns that made Scotland a more convenient location
for suit—including the fact that the relevant evidence was located
in Scotland, and the petitioners would be unable to implead relevant Scottish parties—the Court concluded that the district court
was reasonable in dismissing the case under forum non conveniens.134 The Court acknowledged that Scottish law would be far
less favorable to plaintiffs, but concluded that this “should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the
forum non conveniens inquiry.”135 But it later added that “if the
remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate
or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable
change in law may be given substantial weight.” 136 Forum non
conveniens thereby likely precludes any ATS suit in which there
is some remedy available in a more appropriate forum,137 restricting the number of cases amenable to ATS suits. The risk of US
overreach is thereby limited to a small class of cases, and in these
cases that risk must be weighed against a countervailing risk of
allowing severe violations to go unaddressed.
130 See Jordan B. Redmon, Alien Torts in Foreign Courts: Responsible Restrictions on
Extraterritorial Application of the Alien Tort Statute, 84 Miss L J 1329, 1356 (2015) (“The
extensive development of forum non conveniens jurisprudence in the United States . . .
makes for predictable and efficient resolution of choice-of-forum inquiries in the ATS
context.”).
131 454 US 235 (1981).
132 Id at 254.
133 Id at 235.
134 Id at 237.
135 Piper Aircraft, 454 US at 247.
136 Id at 254 (emphasis added).
137 This may appear to suggest that forum non conveniens could mark the end of the
most ATS litigation. However, it is often the case in ATS cases that no remedy is available
abroad, as transnational corporations often commit abuses in the countries least-equipped
to address those abuses. See Skinner, 121 Penn St L Rev at 659–60 (cited in note 25)
(listing reasons that victims of human rights violations by transnational corporations are
unlikely to obtain compensation, including corrupt judiciaries and lack of a legal basis to
bring a claim). Nonetheless, it may be appropriate for courts to take a more permissive
approach when applying forum non conveniens to ATS suits. See Drimmer and Lamoree,
29 Berkeley J Intl L at 471 (cited in note 123) (“[M]ultiple surveys confirm that plaintiffs
refile a very small percentage of cases abroad after dismissal from United States’ Courts.”).
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Even if a suit touches and concerns the United States sufficiently to satisfy Kiobel, and is brought by plaintiffs with no viable source of redress in their own country, the suit still cannot
survive unless the court establishes personal jurisdiction over defendants. This means that any corporate defendant must either
have affiliations with the forum state that are “so continuous and
systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum,”138
or purposefully conduct activity within the United States that is
related to the subject matter of the suit.139 In ATS contexts, this
severely limits the ability of US courts to meddle in foreign affairs. Either a corporation is essentially “at home” in a US state,
such that there is little practical difference between the corporation and a domestic corporation, or the underlying violation is directly connected to the corporation’s deliberate contacts with the
United States, justifying the United States’ stake in redressing
the violation.
Given these safeguards, the only ATS suits that would survive without the Jesner rule would satisfy all of the following conditions: they must be violations of universal norms; the defendant
must have either strong, consistent ties to the United States or
modest ties connected to the underlying conduct giving rise to the
suit; the violations must touch and concern the United States sufficiently to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality;
and either the United States must be the most convenient forum
or the most convenient forum must offer no possibility of redress.
Therefore, a conservative interpretation of Jesner is unnecessary
to avoid US overreach. ATS suits were already carefully limited
before Jesner was decided.
Indeed, with all these safeguards, it might seem dubious that
the Jesner rule will matter in many cases. Even if a case is dismissed under Jesner, it may well have been dismissed under
other rules in the absence of the Jesner rule. Yet although cases

138 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v Brown, 564 US 915, 919 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). For an application of general personal jurisdiction in an ATS suit,
see generally Daimler AG v Bauman, 571 US 117 (2014) (finding that California district
court did not have personal jurisdiction over a nondomestic corporation that did not have
sufficiently strong ties to California).
139 International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 316–17 (1945). General jurisdiction requires the defendant corporation to be at home in the forum state. See Daimler, 571
US at 127. But when a corporate defendant is not subject to any district court’s jurisdiction, and the claim arises under federal law, specific jurisdiction only requires sufficient
contacts with the nation as a whole. See World Tanker Carriers Corp v MV Ya Mawlaya,
99 F3d 717, 720 (5th Cir 1996).
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that turn on the interpretation of Jesner may be rare, each of
these cases will have high stakes. The example of the litigation
against Nestlé shows how the interpretation of Jesner in a single
case may determine whether a class of former child slaves will be
able to hold culpable corporate actors responsible. In the Nestlé
litigation, the alleged use of slavery was a sufficiently universal
norm to satisfy Sosa;140 the relevant conduct of employees in the
United States overcame the presumption against extraterritoriality, at least enough to survive a motion to dismiss;141 forum non
conveniens was not raised, but likely would be defeated due to
lack of redress for plaintiffs domestically, especially given the alleged role of government actors in the violations at issue;142 and
personal jurisdiction is likely established through defendants’ interactions with the United States, which are connected to the violations alleged.143 Despite all of this, and despite how different
the case is from Jesner, Nestlé SA and Nestlé Ivory Coast appear
to have escaped the courts’ jurisdiction due to a formalistic application of Jesner’s rule. In addition to striking cases like this,
courts will likely use the Jesner rule more frequently in the future. Corporations are becoming more global and complex, and
neat distinctions between what is domestic and what is foreign
are becoming increasingly blurred. Now is the time to clarify the
scope of Jesner.
B.

Why a Formalistic Rule is Poorly Suited to the ATS

With these considerations in mind, this Section turns to possible rules for determining whether a transnational corporation
is foreign for purposes of the ATS. Though the term “transnational corporation” has been defined in various ways, 144 this
140 See Nestle II, 906 F3d at 1124. For a discussion of the Sosa standard, see notes 52
and 53 and accompanying text.
141 See Nestle II, 906 F3d at 1125–26.
142 Doe v Nestle, S.A., 748 F Supp 2d 1057, 1066 (CD Cal 2010).
143 First Amended Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, Doe v
Nestle, S.A., No 205CV05133, *2 (CD Cal filed July 22, 2009) (available on Westlaw at
2009 WL 2921081).
144 See, for example, Janet E. Kerr, A New Era of Responsibility: A Modern American
Mandate for Corporate Social Responsibility, 78 UMKC L Rev 327, 332 n 24 (2009). Professor Kerr defines a transnational corporation as “an enterprise which owns or has production in a host-state outside the country in which it is based,” and cites various alternative definitions, such as “a cluster of corporations of diverse nationality joined together by
ties of common ownership and responsive to a common management strategy.” Id, quoting
Luzius Wildhaber, Some Aspects of the Transnational Corporation in International Law,
27 Neth Intl L Rev 79, 80 (1980).
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Comment uses it to refer to any corporation that is part of an enterprise with substantial operations in multiple countries.145 The
obvious way to interpret Jesner for transnational corporations
might simply follow a formalistic rule already used in other legal
contexts. This Section will look at two such rules in turn: the
place-of-incorporation rule applied at international law and the
similar rule applied domestically to determine corporate citizenship for diversity purposes. Due to key differences between these
legal contexts and the ATS, this Section concludes that such formalistic rules are inappropriate for ATS suits and would undermine the goals espoused in Jesner.
1. International law: the place-of-incorporation rule.
In international law, a corporation’s nationality is determined by the state in which it was incorporated.146 As the Jesner
rule does not derive from international law, but is instead an interpretation of a domestic statute, there is no reason to assume it
is adopting the international definition of “foreign corporation.”
Further, this international law rule is not clearly incorporated
into US law, although the Supreme Court did allude to it in
JPMorgan Chase Bank v Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure
Ltd.147 In JPMorgan Chase, the plaintiff sought to sue under the
federal alienage diversity statute, which grants district courts jurisdiction over civil actions regarding controversies “between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign State.”148 The
defendant corporation argued that it was not a citizen of a foreign
state because it was technically a citizen of the British Virgin Islands, a territory of a foreign state (the United Kingdom) but not

145 In suits in US courts, defendants will presumably consist of discrete corporations
rather than more broadly conceived “enterprises,” which often consist of many corporations. This definition therefore refers to the individual corporations rather than the larger
enterprises they may be a part of (though of course a corporation that individually comprises a transnational enterprise is also included). However, in Part III.B, I argue that
parent-subsidiary distinctions should be given limited weight when determining whether
a corporation is foreign, such that the “foreignness” of the larger enterprise is ultimately
the key issue in determining whether a corporation is a permissible ATS defendant.
146 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 213,
cmt c (1986).
147 536 US 88 (2002). For an early reference to this rule, see National Steamship Co
v Tugman, 106 US 118, 121 (1882) (“[A] corporation [created by the laws of a foreign state]
is, for purposes of jurisdiction in the courts of the United States, to be deemed, constructively, a citizen or subject of such state.”).
148 28 USC § 1332(a)(2).
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a state in its own right, an argument the Court ultimately rejected.149 During its analysis, the Court quoted the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 213,
which states: “For purposes of international law, a corporation
has the nationality of the state under the laws of which the corporation is organized.”150
This issue bears many similarities to the issue of defining foreign corporations for ATS purposes. In both cases, the statute at
issue is a part of the US Code granting original jurisdiction to
district courts, and in both cases the nationality of the defendant
is relevant to whether that jurisdiction survives. Additionally,
both statutes implicate international relations, such that international law is a natural place to look for a guiding rule.
However, it is neither necessary nor sensible for courts to use
this same state-of-incorporation rule to apply the Jesner rule to
ATS cases. First, JPMorgan Chase’s use of the international law
rule did not clearly incorporate it into domestic law. In JPMorgan
Chase, the Court did not discuss the international place-ofincorporation rule or give a formal holding that it applies to US
statutes. Instead, the court merely quoted the Restatement in a
parenthetical following a “Cf.” citation.151 In addition, the rule is
not central to the case, in which the disputed issue was whether
the British Virgin Islands qualified as a “foreign state,” not
the citizenship of defendant corporation. JPMorgan Chase is
hardly a definitive endorsement of international law’s state-ofincorporation rule.
Additionally, key differences between the federal alienage diversity statute and the ATS counsel against extending the international state-of-incorporation rule to the ATS context. First, the
federal alienage diversity statute explicitly limits jurisdiction to
cases in which defendants are “citizens or subjects of a foreign
state,”152 whereas the ATS makes no mention of defendants’ citizenship or nationality. Second, the federal alienage diversity statute makes no distinction between corporations and individuals,
and the Court merely applied the rules of corporate citizenship in
order to apply a rule that relates to individuals and corporations
alike.
149

JPMorgan Chase, 536 US at 92.
Id at 91–92, quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 213 (1986).
151 See JPMorgan Chase, 536 US at 91–92.
152 28 USC § 1332(a)(3).
150
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The Jesner Court, by contrast, did not interpret a statute that
textually distinguishes defendants based on citizenship, but instead established a novel rule distinguishing foreign corporations
as a precluded group without making any blanket rule regarding
all foreign defendants or all corporations. It is therefore clear that
this rule does not arise from legal doctrine or textual interpretation, but is instead based on the practical issues raised by foreign
corporations specifically. For that reason, the Jesner rule need not
be applied according to the simplistic place-of-incorporation rule,
and indeed would be better served by a functional rule that addresses those practical concerns.
2. Domestic law: corporate citizenship for diversity cases.
Another possible source of guidance is the rule used to determine corporate citizenship for diversity jurisdiction purposes. In
that context, the citizenship of a corporation is determined based
on its place of incorporation and its principal place of business,153
and the Supreme Court has interpreted “principal place of business” to mean the corporation’s “nerve center”—usually its headquarters.154 This statutory definition explicitly limits itself to the
question of diversity jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court has left
open the possibility that the citizenship of a corporation might be
defined differently outside of the diversity context. Nonetheless,
it is the most clearly established definition of corporate citizenship in US law, and courts might naturally be inclined to turn to
this definition in applying Jesner.
The issues surrounding jurisdiction over corporations in diversity suits do bear some similarities to those underlying the issue of jurisdiction under the ATS. In diversity suits, courts determine citizenship for the purpose of deciding whether federal
jurisdiction is necessary to avoid unfair bias at the state level in
cases in which citizens of a state sue noncitizens of that state.155
The question is whether the corporation is at home and will not
be at risk of mistreatment due to being an outsider. Similarly, the
Court’s holding in Jesner suggests that Congress does not want
to overreach by asserting jurisdiction over corporations that are
not at home in the United States. In such cases, it will appear
153

28 USC § 1332(c)(1).
See Hertz Corp v Friend, 559 US 77, 92–93 (2010).
155 Hertz Corp, 559 US at 85. See also Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction?
Historical Foundations and Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes
Involving Noncitizens, 21 Yale J Intl L 1, 18 (1996).
154
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that the United States is interfering in another country’s economic affairs, and the United States might be accused of doing so
due to bias or economic motivations.156
Still, the formalistic and bright-line rule for determining citizenship of corporations for diversity purposes is not appropriate
in ATS suits. In the case of diversity jurisdiction, the question is
one of removal, not dismissal, such that a defendant will end up
in court in the United States one way or another. If the defendant
is not a citizen of the forum state, it may remove to federal
court,157 but it may not escape the suit altogether. In other words,
the option of federal court is assumed along with the option of
suing in state court. As such, in diversity cases there is a smaller
risk that injustice will go unaddressed, and courts therefore have
little reason to hesitate in finding that a defendant may be subjected to bias and would be better treated in federal court. Admittedly, the right to invoke diversity jurisdiction hinges on brightline rules that could be gamed by corporations, which can choose
where to incorporate and where to build their headquarters, and
need not do so in the jurisdictions where they do the most business or have the greatest impact. Nonetheless, courts need not
fear such gamesmanship158 because no matter how corporations
manipulate their “citizenship,” proving diversity can only lead to
removal—not dismissal altogether.
In ATS suits, however, the risk is high that no justice will be
available if the defendant is labelled a foreign corporation. That
label would preclude ATS liability after Jesner, potentially barring the suit from US jurisdiction—and ATS suits tend to involve
cases in which redress is not available in plaintiffs’ home countries. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that ATS suits require
particularly grave violations; allowing them to go unaddressed
would be particularly harmful. At the same time, the fact that
ATS suits are limited to such severe harms lessens the risk that
156 See Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1407 (“[T]his suit thus threatens to destabilize Jordan’s
economy.”), quoting Brief for Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Jesner v Arab Bank, PLC, No 16-499, *3 (US filed Aug 28, 2017).
157 28 USC § 1441(b).
158 In addition to explicitly gaming legal systems in order to obtain benefits, corporations are also likely to make decisions on the margins that take advantage of beneficial
laws. For instance, corporations generally incorporate in Delaware because of its businessfriendly laws, even if this decision is not made for sinister reasons. Thus, when this Comment talks about gamesmanship in the ATS context, it not only refers to deceptive corporate behaviors aimed at avoiding law, but also strategic decisions that take advantage of
legal technicalities, even when these decisions are not deceptive or are also motivated by
more legitimate goals.
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the United States will overreach and subject corporations to unfair biases, as these situations are relatively rare. Moreover, a
bright-line rule that invites gamesmanship undermines the purpose of the ATS as stated in Jesner, which is to ensure an available forum in appropriate cases.159
Similarly, the high stakes and rarity of ATS suits suggest
that the administrative costs of applying a flexible standard rather than a hard rule are unlikely to be significant.160 By contrast,
the benefits of applying a more comprehensive and therefore accurate standard are likely high, as preventing a single corporation from escaping liability through gamesmanship is significant
in cases that involve violations such as genocide and war crimes,
not only for the sake of justice, but also for accomplishing the
ATS’s goal of ensuring that the United States holds its actors responsible for wrongful conduct against foreigners.
In sum, compared to the question whether a defendant
should be allowed to remove to federal court by invoking diversity
jurisdiction, the question whether defendants should be permitted to escape ATS liability altogether lends itself to a stronger
presumption in favor of upholding jurisdiction. The risks are
lower because the cases are limited, while the stakes are high because of the severe violations at issue. Further, courts should consider the possible lack of redress for grave human rights abuses
if ATS suits are not permitted, as well as corporations’ incentives
to game the system in order to escape liability through
technicalities.
C. A Functional Standard Would Better Serve the ATS’s
Purpose
The preceding analysis of two possible formal rules for determining how to define foreign corporations for ATS purposes

159

Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1397.
There is a great deal of literature on the tradeoffs between rules and standards.
The conventional understanding is that rules, such as a speed limit of 60 miles per hour,
have the advantage of being cheap to apply (it is easy to tell if someone is driving over 60
miles per hour), but the disadvantage of being less accurate because they are over- and
underinclusive (under certain conditions, it might be safer to drive slower or faster than
60 miles per hour). Standards, such as laws requiring drivers to “drive safely,” are costly
to apply (How do you determine if someone is driving “safely”?), but more accurate because
they can incorporate the facts of a situation (driving safely during a storm may require a
different speed than driving safely to get someone to a hospital in an emergency). For an
example of the discussion on rules and standards, see generally Isaac Ehrlich and Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J Legal Stud 257 (1974).
160
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demonstrates why such rigid tests are inappropriate. Jesner cited
practical motivations for its holding, but a state-of-incorporation
or location-of-headquarters rule would poorly serve those considerations. Instead, a formal rule would allow suits to proceed or
fail on easily manipulated legal technicalities. These considerations, which are common shortcomings of rules as compared to
standards, 161 suggest that a functional standard may be better
than a formalistic rule for determining ATS jurisdiction over
transnational corporations.162
Personal jurisdiction over nondomestic corporations in federal courts provides guidance for what such a functional standard
might look like. Though personal jurisdiction may seem somewhat removed from the question of how to define a foreign corporation, personal jurisdiction doctrine bears important similarities
to the question of ATS jurisdiction. When courts find that they
lack jurisdiction in either case, they dismiss the case; they do not
simply allow removal to a different court as they do when they
find diversity. As discussed above, this means that the stakes are
higher and it is more important that courts get the answer right
and prevent gamesmanship.
In addition, both personal jurisdiction and ATS jurisdiction
are limited by vital and sensitive constitutional goals. Personal
jurisdiction is bounded by due process, a constitutional principle
that cannot be restricted. Due process is also a complex issue that
cannot be resolved by any simple bright-line rule.163 Jurisdiction
under the ATS is limited by the separation of powers, as courts

161

See, for example, id at 268 (discussing the over- and underinclusiveness of rules).
On the other hand, there are oft-cited advantages of rules over standards, such as
the ease of understanding and applying them. See id at 262–67. As will be discussed further, however, the rarity and severity of ATS suits suggests that the relative ease of applying a rule is insignificant. It is easier to identify a defendant’s place of incorporation
than to conduct a functional analysis of corporate activities, but such an analysis is still
not very difficult. In occasional suits arising from extreme international law violations, it
is not unreasonable to ask courts to do some basic research into a corporation’s business
activity.
As for ease of understanding the rule, it is not necessary to provide corporations with
absolute certainty as to whether they may be ATS defendants. If a corporation mistakenly
fears it is subject to ATS suits and abstains from severe international law violations as a
result, no harm is done. Conversely, a corporation is unlikely to be underdeterred in the
ATS context, as any corporations incorporated in the United States will remain clearly
subject to suit. Finally, it is not unfair to surprise corporations by holding them accountable for these severe violations, assuming jurisdiction is otherwise appropriate; they can
hardly argue that they were unaware of international norms against genocide, slavery, or
other such acts.
163 See, for example, Daimler, 571 US at 125.
162
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must refrain from interfering in foreign affairs by overextending
their jurisdiction.164 This goal is similarly urgent, and is also similarly ill-suited to a bright-line rule: whether a given suit risks
causing diplomatic friction by meddling in the affairs of other nations is a complex question likely to turn on the facts of a given
case.
Whether a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a nondomestic corporate defendant does not turn on a formalistic rule
but instead looks to the reality of a corporation’s contacts with the
jurisdiction. 165 The governing standard for general jurisdiction
over a defendant—that is, jurisdiction that covers all of the defendant’s actions—is stated in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v Brown.166 In Goodyear, the Court explained that “[a]
court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign . . . corporations
to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations
with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render them
essentially at home in the forum state.”167 In other words, personal jurisdiction is established based on a holistic picture of a
corporation’s ties to the forum.
The governing standard for specific jurisdiction—jurisdiction
based on a relationship between the forum and the specific underlying controversy—derives from International Shoe Co v
Washington. 168 In International Shoe, the Supreme Court reasoned that “in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, [due
process requires that] he have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 169 As with general
jurisdiction, then, specific jurisdiction looks to a holistic picture
of a corporation’s relations with the forum. In J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd v Nicastro,170 the Court elaborated on this rule,
concluding that the “minimum contacts” required must arise from
a defendant’s activity directed at the forum state, because such

164 See, for example, Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1398 (“ATS litigation implicates serious
separation-of-powers and foreign relations concerns. Thus, ATS claims must be subject to
vigilant doorkeeping.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
165 Id at 291.
166 564 US 915 (2011).
167 Id at 919 (quotation marks omitted).
168 326 US 310 (1945).
169 Id at 316 (quotation marks omitted).
170 564 US 873 (2011).
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intentional activity constitutes a defendant’s submission to the
state’s authority:
Where a defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws, it submits to the judicial power of an otherwise foreign sovereign to the extent
that power is exercised in connection with the defendant’s activities touching on the State.171
This provides a normative yardstick for measuring a corporation’s
connections to the forum: if they amount to “purposeful availment” of that forum, jurisdiction over cases arising from that
availment is justified.
Personal jurisdiction, whether general or specific, thereby depends on a corporation’s functional relationship with the forum.
When judging that relationship, courts explicitly consider the
normative goal of due process by asking whether a corporation’s
contacts with the forum make jurisdiction fair. While determining personal jurisdiction is therefore more burdensome than applying a bright-line rule, it is also more accurate because courts
make a flexible judgment based on the full facts of the case. As
discussed previously, this makes sense because jurisdictional
questions are often outcome determinative, due process is an essential aim that should not be sacrificed to expediency or undermined by gamesmanship, and whether jurisdiction satisfies due
process is a complicated question that cannot be easily reduced to
a bright-line rule.
ATS suits would similarly benefit from a standard that prioritizes accuracy and flexibility over expediency. The stakes are
high because dismissing a suit will likely mean that no redress is
available to plaintiffs, the violations at issue are extreme, and the
ATS serves the important goal of holding US actors accountable
for their injuries to foreign nationals. At the same time, the complexity of determining whether a given case would effectively
serve this goal suggests that any bright-line rule would fail to accurately distinguish between cases that would further the ATS’s
purpose and those that would undermine it. And finally, the relative infrequency of ATS suits means that the added burden of a
functional standard is unlikely to be significant. For all of these
reasons, a functional standard that reflects the ATS’s goal—like

171

Id at 881 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
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the functional standard used to determine personal jurisdiction—
is far better suited to the ATS than a formalistic rule.
In addition to illustrating why a functional standard is appropriate for the ATS, personal jurisdiction doctrine offers guidance as to what such a standard might look like: courts should
consider the nature of the corporation’s functional contacts with
the United States in light of the ATS’s goal. In the case of personal
jurisdiction, courts look at these contacts to determine whether
jurisdiction is “fair,” as fairness is the goal of due process.172 In
ATS suits, courts should look at these contacts to determine
whether jurisdiction would further or inhibit the goal of holding
US actors accountable for serious violations against foreign nationals. That is, courts should look holistically at a corporation’s
relationship with the United States, and exercise jurisdiction if it
would further the ATS’s goal of holding US actors accountable but
refrain from jurisdiction over any case that would hinder that
goal by meddling in the affairs of other nations.
III. THE FUNCTIONAL FOREIGNNESS TEST
A review of analogous areas of law has revealed that a functional standard based on the ATS’s purpose is most appropriate
for defining foreign corporations. Jesner states that the ATS’s
purpose is to “ensur[e] the availability of a federal forum where
the failure to provide one might cause another nation to hold the
United States responsible for an injury to a foreign citizen.”173 The
definition of foreign corporation should therefore distinguish
cases in which the United States has a genuine responsibility to
hold a corporation responsible from those in which the United
States would be policing corporations insufficiently connected to
it. Guided by these considerations, I propose an inquiry into
whether the United States’ ties to a corporation are at least as
strong as any other nation’s. I call this standard the Functional
Foreignness Test. A corporation that passes the Test proves that,
in light of its relatively limited ties to the United States, it is in
fact foreign. A corporation that fails the Test reveals that, though
perhaps incorporated abroad, its functional ties to the United
States show that it is not truly foreign. The United States has a
responsibility to hold such a corporation accountable for its injuries to foreign nationals.
172
173

International Shoe, 326 US at 316.
Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1397.
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This formulation offers numerous advantages. As a broad
standard rather than a formalistic rule, it prevents gamesmanship174 and reduces the likelihood that severe injuries subject to
the ATS will go unaddressed. By focusing on US actors’ relative
culpabilities, the Test hews closely to the guiding principle of
Jesner, which is to prevent the United States from interfering
with corporations with strong ties to another nation, while also
preventing the United States from failing to take responsibility
for injuries legitimately connected to it.175 The Test both avoids
blame directed at the United States for ignoring serious human
rights violations and respects international norms of limited interference with the affairs of another nation’s corporations. The
administrative burdens of a flexible standard instead of a rule are
not high given the narrow set of cases in which ATS suits are possible, especially in light of other existing safeguards. And above
all, by remaining flexible and goal-oriented, this standard does
not sacrifice sensitive foreign relations issues to the expediency of
a formalistic rule.
To illustrate how the Functional Foreignness Test might be
applied, this Part proceeds as follows: First, it identifies and explains a number of factors likely to be relevant to the Functional
Foreignness Test. Then, it considers how the Functional Foreignness Test ought to view the parent-subsidiary relationship, as
this issue is likely to be dispositive in many ATS cases. Next, it
applies the Functional Foreignness Test to the Nestlé litigation
to show how it could be decisive in high-stakes suits. Finally, it
concludes by responding to a likely criticism: that the Functional
Foreignness Test would amount to judicial overreach, violating
the separation of powers.
A.

Relevant Factors

A number of factors are likely to be relevant in a holistic
analysis of a corporation’s ties to the United States. These include: the place of incorporation; the location of corporate facilities; the amount of business conducted in the United States; the
financial relationship to the United States; and the nationality of
board members, employees, and shareholders. These factors
should not be considered in isolation, but rather should contribute
to a holistic picture that reveals whether US courts ought to hold
174
175

See Part III.B.2.
See note 66 and accompanying text.
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the corporation responsible for its wrongdoings. 176 Underlying
each of these factors are two interwoven questions. First, is the
United States contributing to the corporation’s activity such that
it bears some responsibility for the corporation’s violations? And
second, has the corporation chosen to take advantage of US resources, such that US oversight is justified and less likely to be
interpreted as meddling?
If a corporation—including a subsidiary of another corporation—is incorporated in the United States, it will of course qualify
as a domestic corporation for the purpose of ATS suits. Corporations not incorporated in the United States should be considered
using the other factors to determine the extent of their contact
with the United States. This avoids the potential technicality of
allowing businesses to escape liability simply by filing chartering
documents in another country while committing torts that touch
and concern the United States.
Additionally, the Functional Foreignness Test should look at
how much corporate activity is conducted through facilities in the
United States. Following Hertz Corp v Friend, 177 corporations
should be considered nationals of the United States if their headquarters are located in the United States. Beyond that, other facilities such as factories, retail locations, or warehouses should
also be taken into account. Such facilities indicate that the United
States is providing a forum for the corporation’s activities, and
also that the corporation is purposefully availing itself of US territory, to use the language of J. McIntyre.178
Similarly, when a corporation conducts a sufficient amount
of business with the United States, the United States is implicated in that corporation’s activity because it is supporting that
corporation financially by providing access to the US market. At
the same time, by availing themselves of the US market, transnational corporations arguably indicate “an intention to benefit

176 Similarly, the Test itself should not be considered in isolation from other ATS
rules, especially the Kiobel rule requiring that cases touch and concern the United States.
Both of these tests are driven by the same concern: avoiding United States overreach into
affairs not sufficiently connected to it. Requiring that both the corporation and the violation at issue be closely tied to the United States is excessive and could prevent the United
States from exercising oversight in cases closely connected with it. Instead, failing the
Functional Foreignness Test should carry a presumption that the Kiobel rule has been
satisfied as well. That is, courts should presume that the case touches and concerns the
United States precisely because of its close tie to the alleged perpetrator.
177 559 US 77 (2010).
178 See J. McIntyre, 564 US at 881.
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from and thus an intention to submit to the laws of” the United
States.179
If a transnational corporation relies heavily on financing
from US banks or other US sources, the United States would implicate itself in the corporation’s actions by financing and supporting the corporation. Again, the corporation’s beneficial use of
US finances would justify some US oversight. Conversely, when
a corporation has stronger financial ties to another nation’s economy than to the United States’, as with Arab Bank, imposing liability would increase diplomatic friction180 and therefore tilt the
balance toward a finding of foreignness.
Finally, the Functional Foreignness Test should take into account the nationality of the various actors involved in the corporation. If many of those actors are US nationals, US actors are
substantially responsible for the corporation’s acts. If the board of
directors includes many US citizens, then US citizens are responsible for overseeing the activities of the corporation. When many
employees are US citizens, US citizens are carrying out the acts
of the corporation. Finally, when US citizens make up a large portion of the shareholders, US capital is effectively funding the corporation and its activities, much like corporations financed by US
banks. In each of these cases the corporation is receiving a substantial benefit from the United States, either through human
capital or money, such that the United States can reasonably
choose to impose costs in return for these benefits.
B.

The Parent-Subsidiary Distinction in the Functional
Foreignness Test

An important difficulty of the Functional Foreignness Test is
how to treat parent-subsidiary relationships. This question is essential and could easily be dispositive in most cases, which is why
I give it extended treatment here. The United States’ ties to a
transnational corporation will often be relegated to legally distinct US subsidiaries, and the international violations committed
by transnational corporations will often be carried out by subsidiaries abroad. I argue that in applying the Test, courts should
take a functional approach to differentiating the actions of parent
corporations from their subsidiaries.

179
180

Id.
See note 67 and accompanying text.
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1. The importance of a functional assessment of parentsubsidiary relationships.
The same aspects of ATS suits that justify the Functional
Foreignness Test generally suggest that a functional approach
should also be taken with respect to parent-subsidiary relationships. Because the ATS furthers important and sensitive goals,
its application should not turn on easily manipulated formalities.
And once again, the high stakes and low frequency of ATS suits
mean that accuracy is more important than expediency in determining which defendants are truly foreign.
Most importantly, the purpose of the ATS as stated in Jesner
would be severely undermined by strict adherence to legal fictions. After all, the goal is to hold US actors responsible for their
injuries to foreign nationals. Such a goal would be ill-served by a
self-imposed technicality that allows corporations with strong ties
to the United States to escape jurisdiction. When a transnational
corporate enterprise is as strongly tied to the United States as to
any other nation, such technicalities are unlikely to affect the
United States’ responsibility in the eyes of foreign nations. Yet
over-adherence to corporate fictions would allow corporations
that would otherwise be subject to the ATS to avoid liability easily
by ensuring that corporate ties to the United States are sustained
through a separate corporate personality than the one committing violations.
For these reasons, when applying the Functional Foreignness
Test, legal fictions regarding distinct corporate personalities
should be adhered to only to the extent that they reflect the reality
of the corporations’ activities.181 This means that when a transnational corporate enterprise as a whole fails the Test, its various
component corporations should fail as well. If a parent corporation fails the test, its subsidiaries should consequently fail. This

181 This rule would not be the first to acknowledge that corporations often consist of
a cohesive enterprise legally divided into numerous distinct corporations. For antitrust
purposes, for instance, US law distinguishes anticompetitive activity between distinct
“entities” from anticompetitive activity between components of “a corporate enterprise
organized into divisions,” which “must be judged as the conduct of a single actor.”
Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Corp, 467 US 752, 769–71 (1984) (explaining why
“the coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as
that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act”). Similarly, countries
such as England may, for legal purposes, recognize a “single economic entity” comprised
of the various components of a transnational corporation. See Claudia M. Pardinas, The
Enigma of the Legal Liability of Transnational Corporations, 14 Suffolk Transnatl L J
405, 453 (1991).
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rule would ensure that corporations that ought to be held liable
under the ATS cannot avoid that liability simply by relegating
violations to subsidiaries that will be entirely beyond US reach.
2. Why a functional approach is consistent with
current law.
This approach might appear to fly in the fact of current practice. Generally, under the principle of limited liability, the legal
distinction between parent and subsidiary corporations protects
each one from liability for the acts of the other. As the Supreme
Court stated in United States v Bestfoods,182 “It is a general principle of corporate law deeply ingrained in our economic and legal
systems that a parent corporation . . . is not liable for the acts of
its subsidiaries.”183 The Court explained that even though a parent may own a subsidiary’s stock and therefore elect directors,
make bylaws, and otherwise control the subsidiary, the “bedrock
principle” of limited liability nonetheless rules.184
But the Functional Foreignness Test is about jurisdiction,
not liability. So the rule of limited liability does not require courts
to give dispositive weight to legal distinctions between parents
and subsidiaries for the purpose of the Functional Foreignness
Test. Indeed, limited liability would still apply in its full force,
guaranteeing that no corporate entity’s assets would be used
to pay for the acts of another. The functional view of parentsubsidiary relationships for which I advocate would consider the
entire corporate enterprise’s relationship to the United States
only for the narrow purpose of determining whether the components of that enterprise ought to answer for grave international
law violations in US courts. But it would not hold any corporation
liable for the acts of another. This would have the limited effect
of allowing courts to exercise jurisdiction over otherwise insulated
subsidiaries.
Additionally, even the principle of limited liability gives way
when justice demands it. As the Bestfoods Court explained:
[T]here is an equally fundamental principle of corporate law,
applicable to the parent-subsidiary relationship as well as
182

524 US 51 (1998).
Id at 61 (quotation marks omitted).
184 Id at 62. See also Nina A. Mendleson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 Colum L Rev 1203, 1267 (2002); Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimited” Shareholding Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers,
57 Vand L Rev 329, 356 (2004).
183
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generally, that the corporate veil may be pierced and the
shareholder held liable for the corporation’s conduct when,
inter alia, the corporate form would otherwise be misused to
accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most notably fraud,
on the shareholder’s behalf.185
Such cases are a “rare exception,” but they indicate that even limited liability is not absolute.186
There is not a single, settled formulation of the federal common law rule187 for piercing the corporate veil.188 Generally, most
circuits rely on a fact-intensive analysis focusing on the nature of
the relationship between the corporation and the shareholders (or
parent) as well as the risk of allowing injustice if the legal fiction
of the separate corporate personality were upheld.189 Courts often
require fraud or some other egregious behavior by an actor in order to hold it liable for the acts of another, but there is also evidence that the federal doctrine—as compared to some state doctrines—is somewhat flexible, with more emphasis on federal
policy.190 In Anderson v Abbot,191 for instance, the Supreme Court
noted that “the interposition of a corporation will not be allowed
to defeat a legislative policy, whether that was the aim or only the
result of the arrangement.”192
This is not to suggest that the rule of limited liability would
look different in ATS contexts, or would more frequently allow for
veil piercing, but it establishes that courts do not always give dispositive weight to legal fictions, and that federal policy is a relevant consideration in this regard. In ATS suits, when a sensitive
federal policy is at stake and the question is jurisdiction rather
than liability, there is no reason that the outcome should hinge
on corporate fictions.

185

Bestfoods, 524 US at 52.
Dole Food Co v Patrickson, 538 US 468, 475 (2003).
187 Federal common law would presumably apply to ATS cases given that they arise
from federal common law causes of action. Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1397 (“Congress enacted
[the ATS] against the backdrop of the general common law, which in 1789 recognized a
limited category of torts in violation of the law of nations.”) (quotation marks omitted).
188 See Joshua E. Kurland, Veil-Piercing in Customs Enforcement Proceedings: The
Role of Federal Common Law, 23 Tulane J Intl & Comp L 363, 372 (2015) (“The federal
veil-piercing standards differ somewhat among the various federal circuit courts.”).
189 See id.
190 See id at 369–71.
191 321 US 349 (1944).
192 Id at 363.
186
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Applying the Functional Foreignness Test: The Example of
Nestlé

The Functional Foreignness Test would have a modest but
important effect on ATS liability. Given the various hurdles discussed in Part II.A, it would only be relevant under certain circumstances. A transnational corporate enterprise would need to
violate a universal norm of international law. The violation would
need to be sufficiently connected to US territory to satisfy personal jurisdiction and overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. Even then, the court would need to determine that
a US forum is most appropriate, perhaps because redress is not
available elsewhere.
The most likely cases to fit this profile are cases of integrated
global enterprises wherein corporations conducting substantial
activity in the United States simultaneously commit serious violations in other parts of the world. The US activity might be tied
to those violations due to the integrated nature of the enterprise.
For instance, products sold in the United States might derive
from injuries committed elsewhere or corporate facilities in the
United States might direct or oversee the injurious conduct. In
this narrow but important set of cases, the final hurdle might be
the Jesner rule. Under a formalistic test, jurisdiction would turn
entirely on a formality such as whether culpable corporate defendants were initially incorporated abroad. Under the Functional Foreignness Test, courts would look instead to the reality
of the enterprise’s economic ties to the United States. Jurisdiction
would attach only if the enterprise were as closely tied to the
United States as to any other nation. However, once that condition was satisfied, jurisdiction would survive regardless of any legal formalities. The fact that a defendant was initially incorporated abroad, or was legally distinct from the portion of the
enterprise tied to the United States, would not be dispositive.
For an example of how the Test might be applied, consider
again the suit against Nestlé. In a supplemental brief before the
Ninth Circuit, Nestlé USA emphasized that plaintiffs could only
succeed by attributing to Nestlé USA the actions of its non-US
affiliates, Nestlé SA and Nestlé Ivory Coast.193 If this is true, then
a formalistic rule labelling Nestlé SA and Nestlé Ivory Coast as

193 See Supplemental Brief of Nestlé USA, Inc, Doe v Nestle, S.A., No 17-55435, *4–5
(9th Cir filed May 18, 2018) (available on Westlaw at 2018 WL 2299136) (Nestlé Supplemental Brief).
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foreign corporations—a rule that the Ninth Circuit apparently
applied without considering alternatives194—will preclude any recovery for the plaintiffs.
However, the Functional Foreignness Test would allow plaintiffs’ suit to proceed against both Nestlé SA and Nestlé Ivory
Coast. Nestlé SA, the original Nestlé corporation, was incorporated in Switzerland. However, the Nestlé enterprise has strong
ties with the United States. As of Nestlé’s 2018 Annual Review,
which does not draw distinctions between Nestlé SA and its many
subsidiaries, 36.5 percent of Nestlé’s share capital was in the
United States—more than the 34.9 percent in Switzerland, and
more than seven times as much as in any other country.195 As a
result, the nationality of shareholders weighs against a finding of
foreignness. Regarding the nationality of employees, the report
stated that approximately 3.1 percent of Nestlé’s employees were
in Switzerland, whereas 33.9 percent were in the Americas. 196
Though the report did not break down this statistic by country, it
is likely that most of these employees were in the United States,
where 77 of Nestlé’s 413 factories were located.197 This is more
than in any other single country, and only eleven factories were
located in Switzerland.198 As a result, the nationality of employees
and the location of corporate facilities both weigh strongly against
foreignness. Further, 44.9 percent of Nestlé’s sales were in the
Americas (again, there is no breakdown by country) compared to
29.4 percent of sales to Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa
combined, indicating that business with the United States heavily factors against foreignness as well.199 Finally, Nestlé SA’s CEO
is a US citizen, along with two other members of its twelve-person
executive board, while four members of the board are Swiss.200 In
this way, Swiss leadership does not appear to significantly outweigh American leadership, which modestly supports a finding
that Nestlé SA is not foreign.
Taken as a whole, Nestlé clearly fails the Test because its ties
to the United States are at least as strong as (and in this case,
194

See Nestle II, 906 F3d at 1124.
Annual Review 2018 *59 (Nestlé 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/E2R2-M2US.
196 Id at *47.
197 Id at *56.
198 Id.
199 Annual Review 2018 at *47 (cited in note 195).
200 See id at 62–63 (listing executive board members). Board member nationalities
were determined based on CVs available on Nestlé’s website. Executive Board (Nestlé
2019), archived at http://perma.cc/5225-7LV3.
195

2236

The University of Chicago Law Review

[86:2193

stronger than) its ties to other nations. Though Nestlé SA began
in Switzerland, Nestlé’s ties to Switzerland are no stronger today
than its ties to the United States, which contributes enormously
to its monetary and human capital and serves as a key market for
its products. In light of this reality, there is no logical basis for
letting the outcome of the Nestlé litigation hinge on the place
where Nestlé SA was originally incorporated. Such a formalistic
rule would undermine the purpose of the ATS by allowing an actor with close ties to the United States to commit serious violations against foreign people without consequences. Nestlé admittedly does have strong ties to Switzerland, and Switzerland might
still object to Nestlé SA being sued in US courts. However, this
would be equally true of a corporation that began in the United
States and later developed strong ties to another nation. In other
words, there is no principled reason to make place of incorporation the dispositive issue; it simply makes more sense to focus on
substantive economic ties.
As a technical matter, Nestlé’s US activity is largely conducted by US subsidiaries of Nestlé. However, this activity ought
to be viewed as part of a single, transnational corporate enterprise for the purposes of the Functional Foreignness Test in light
of the functional reality of Nestlé’s operations. First, the statistics
cited above were in a single report from Nestlé’s “global” website,
Nestle.com, and the report does not distinguish between the operations of Nestlé SA and its various subsidiaries. In fact, the report does not include the term “subsidiary” at all. Nestle.com even
has a page answering the question, “How many different Nestlé
companies are there?” by saying, “There is just one Nestlé.” 201
Though this page is merely a marketing tool and is clearly not
making any legal claim, it nonetheless illustrates the way Nestlé
conceives of its global enterprise and presents itself to the public.
This characterization of the Nestlé enterprise stands in stark contrast to Nestlé USA’s supplemental brief responding to Jesner,
which emphasizes its distance from other Nestlé corporations:
“Nestlé, USA, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Nestle Holdings, Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of NIMCO US, Inc.,
which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Nestlé, S.A., a publicly
traded Swiss corporation.”202 It is only when litigation begins that

201 How Many Different Nestlé Companies Are There? (Nestlé 2019), archived at
http://perma.cc/6NXZ-YVYN.
202 Nestlé Supplemental Brief at *i (cited in note 193).

2019]

Legal Fictions and Foreign Frictions

2237

Nestlé—a transnational company whose global activities comprise an integrated enterprise—is suddenly framed as a disjointed conglomerate of distinct personalities. As a result, the legal fiction distinguishing Nestlé USA from its Swiss parent does
not prevent Nestlé SA it from failing the Functional Foreignness
Test.
For the same reason, Nestlé Ivory Coast fails the Functional
Foreignness Test as a part of a larger corporate enterprise that
fails the Test. In this manner, Nestlé SA—which has sufficient
US ties to justify an ATS suit against it—cannot escape liability
by shifting responsibility for its human rights violations to a foreign subsidiary. To reiterate, this does not mean Nestlé SA or any
other component of the Nestlé enterprise will be held liable for
the acts of another; this would only be possible if typical veilpiercing requirements were satisfied. It simply means that the
United States, as the country most substantially implicated in
Nestlé’s global activity, might be able to exercise jurisdiction over
Nestlé and its subsidiaries in order to hold each one accountable
for its own violations.203
Ultimately, the Functional Foreignness Test would allow former child slaves the opportunity to face the perpetrators of their
slavery that are closely tied to the United States in court. A formalistic rule, on the other hand, would deny this opportunity
based solely on a technicality.
D. The Separation of Powers
Finally, I conclude by responding briefly to an objection that
is sure to arise: that a court’s application of the Functional Foreignness Test might violate the constitutional separation of powers. Even if the Functional Foreignness Test furthers the purpose
of the ATS and is consistent with other areas of law, one might
argue that this is a question for the political branches, not the
courts. A proponent of this view might say that no matter how
compelling the arguments in favor of a more expansive view of
203 In the case of subsidiaries such as Nestlé Ivory Coast, personal jurisdiction may
still pose a significant barrier if the subsidiary itself does not conduct business with the
United States. This may be overcome in some cases, and a more realistic view of parentsubsidiary relationships for the purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction might be
beneficial for many of the reasons discussed in this Comment. However, the issue of personal jurisdiction for transnational corporate actors is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Moreover, even if personal jurisdiction ultimately bars ATS cases against subsidiaries
such as Nestlé Ivory Coast, allowing suits against actors such as Nestlé SA under the
Functional Foreignness Test will still be a significant step in the right direction.
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ATS jurisdiction—whether based on principles of justice, statutory interpretation, policy considerations, or others—such arguments are ultimately trumped by the separation of powers, which
suggests that the ATS, as a statute regarding foreign relations,
should not be extended in any manner without input from Congress or the Executive.204 However, the Functional Foreignness
Test overcomes this objection for several reasons.
First, given the mystery that surrounds the initial goal and
intended implications of the ATS, the question is not whether to
expand the ATS, but rather what the ATS entails in the first
place. There is no settled body of jurisprudence that could be said
to constitute the ATS’s traditional application; it had virtually no
application whatsoever until it was suddenly applied in expansive
and controversial ways, beginning with Filartiga. But even
though it was several centuries ago, Congress did enact the ATS,
and deference to Congress should therefore mean an attempt to
determine the ATS’s meaning as accurately, but not necessarily
as restrictively, as possible.205
This argument might seem abstract or naïve to the realities
of foreign relations as ordinarily directed by Congress and the Executive Branch. To be sure, one might argue that no matter how
the ATS is understood, it is being applied in new ways that potentially interfere with foreign relations. Arguing that this new
application is not an “expansion” may seem like a semantic trick.
Yet even a more grounded view of the ATS, in light of its historic
use and its purpose as formulated by Jesner, still suggests that a
functional approach to defining foreign corporations is not an expansion and is unlikely to step on the toes of the legislature. To
demonstrate this point, I will show that although Jesner advocates judicial restraint, implementing its holding through a functional standard is ultimately consistent with its reasoning. While
204 See, for example, Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1403 (“[S]eparation-of-powers concerns that
counsel against courts creating private rights of action apply with particular force in the
context of the ATS,” which implicates “foreign-policy concerns” most appropriately addressed by the “political branches, not the Judiciary.”); Sosa, 542 US at 748 (Scalia concurring in part and in the judgment) (warning that the lower courts, in interpreting the
ATS too expansively, were headed down a path leading “directly into confrontation with
the political branches”); id at 727 (Souter) (majority) (stating that courts should be “particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in
managing foreign affairs”).
205 For a discussion probing Congress’s original intent in passing the ATS, including
the need to fulfill that intent without unduly expanding the statute, see Ingrid Wuerth,
The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach, 85 Notre Dame L Rev
1931, 1941–43 (2010).
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courts are properly wary of interfering with the political branches’
power over foreign relations, neither Jesner nor the ATS itself
forecloses some judicial role in determining the scope of ATS jurisdiction over transnational corporations.
A close read of the majority’s reasoning in Jesner supports
this view. Jesner discussed the Court’s “general reluctance to extend judicially created private rights of action,” arguing that “the
Legislature is in the better position to consider if the public interest would be served by imposing a new substantive legal liability.”206 It counseled against creating a damages remedy if there
are even “sound reasons” to believe Congress might disagree with
that remedy.207 Given the foreign policy implications of the ATS,
the Court reasoned that this cautious approach applied with “particular force” to the ATS. 208 In its most skeptical remarks, the
Court even casts doubt on whether a new cause of action under
the ATS would ever be a proper application of judicial discretion
under Sosa.209 Considered as a whole, Jesner depicts an extremely
narrow role for the courts in permitting ATS suits.
At first glance, this may appear damning for any application
of the ATS besides the most conservative possible interpretation.
However, the Court’s reasoning essentially focuses on two problems with allowing ATS suits against foreign corporations. First,
it would extend the United States’ current role in policing the activities of foreign entities. Second, it would risk negative diplomatic responses. Neither of these concerns counsel against a functional standard for identifying foreign corporations.
The distinction between foreign and domestic corporations is
a novel rule. So it is difficult to convincingly say that one way of
distinguishing foreign corporations from others is an extension of
the ATS, while a different interpretation simply upholds the status quo. There is no clear status quo regarding the ATS generally—it was only used twice over two hundred years, then suddenly wielded by parties in a series of recent and controversial
cases—let alone its limitation to nonforeign corporations. Given
this lack of precedent, taking a functional approach that considers why foreign corporate defendants have been precluded makes
sense. The answer is that the ATS is about enabling the United
States to take responsibility for the acts of its nationals rather
206
207
208
209

Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1402.
Id.
Id at 1403.
Id.
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than enabling it to police external actors.210 In light of this goal,
and the fact that there is little other congressional intent or precedent to look to for guidance, a functional standard that focuses
on the defendant’s relationship with the United States is best
suited to determining the contours of ATS jurisdiction over transnational corporations.
Even if courts wish to take a conservative approach based on
separation-of-powers concerns arising from foreign policy implications, they should at least be able to indicate how an alternative
approach might cause diplomatic friction. The judiciary is not so
inept that such a baseline inquiry into the consequences of its
decisions is too far beyond its capacity. In fact, such an inquiry
is necessary to determine what issues implicate separation-ofpowers concerns in the first place. In Jesner, the risk of causing
diplomatic friction was obvious given Arab Bank’s prominent role
in Jordan’s economy. 211 However, for corporations that fail the
Functional Foreignness Test, the United States is putting its own
economic interests on the line as much as much as the interests
of any other country.
Moreover, refraining from imposing liability on corporations
closely tied to the United States would mean that the ATS’s goal
could not be achieved. Foreign nationals would be harmed by
what are essentially US actors, and no forum would be available
for redress—the very circumstance the ATS was designed to preclude. 212 In other words, the apparently conservative approach
could be the choice that would cause diplomatic friction, so that
courts cannot simply err on one side or the other to avoid such a
result. Instead, they ought to judge whether each case runs a risk
of causing such frictions, thereby implementing Congress’ chosen
policy as described in Jesner.
In a similar vein, courts should not discount the long-term
goal of reducing diplomatic friction. When the United States holds
corporations accountable for severe violations of international
law, short-term friction related to particular defendants will
likely be outweighed by long-term diplomatic benefits arising
from protecting the rights of other foreign actors and promoting
international law and global justice. These goals are better served
if the judiciary, rather than the political branches, is the one exerting a broader vision of US jurisdiction over international bad
210
211
212

See notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
See Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1406–07.
Id at 1397.
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actors; this reinforces the perception of the United States promoting the rule of law rather than making political maneuvers. Even
if Switzerland does not like the idea of US jurisdiction over Nestlé
SA, the international community—which has expressed outrage
over Nestlé’s use of child slavery and sought to curb it—may well
applaud the United States for taking responsibility for actors
closely tied to it.
CONCLUSION
The Jesner rule precluding foreign corporations as ATS defendants should not be applied in a strict, formalistic manner. Instead, courts should determine ATS jurisdiction in light of the corporation’s functional relationship with the United States. In this
way, the ATS will best achieve its primary goal of providing a forum for redress in cases in which US actors have injured foreign
nationals. Such a standard will not be too costly or inconvenient
due to the narrow class of cases that give rise to ATS suits in the
first place. Moreover, it will not allow important foreign policy issues to be resolved based on a technicality. The Jesner court affirmed the United States’ responsibility to hold its actors accountable for violations against foreign nationals. To honor that goal,
corporations cannot be provided loopholes for escaping justice.

